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a b s t r a c t 
Applying an observable delay game framework developed in noncooperative game theory, we investigate 
the timing problem concerning when a manufacturer managing dual-channel supply chains, consisting 
of a retail channel and a direct channel, should post its wholesale price and direct price. Conventionally, 
operational research models describing dual-channel supply chains examine price competition, where 
the retailer and the manufacturer simultaneously determine the retail and direct prices, respectively. In 
contrast to this conventional setting, our model demonstrates that such simultaneous price competition 
never arises if the manufacturer and retailer can choose not only the level of the price but also the 
timing of pricing. If the manufacturer sets the direct price after setting the wholesale price to the retailer, 
the retailer accelerates the timing of retail pricing prior to the direct price setting by the manufacturer. 
Our ﬁndings suggest that the manufacturer should post the direct price before or upon, but not after, 
setting the wholesale price for the retailer. This upfront posting of the direct price not only constitutes 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game between channel members but also 
maximizes the proﬁts for a manufacturer employing multichannel sales strategies. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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0. Introduction 
Multichannel sales strategies are now very popular owing to the
revalence of the Internet, which makes it much easier for manu-
acturers to engage in direct sales. Because direct channels, includ-
ng catalogs and the Internet, compete against, substitute for, or
omplement conventional retail channels, ﬁnding the best way to
tilize them in conjunction with retail channels continues to be
 challenge for many ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, multiple channels give rise
o channel conﬂict when different channels compete for almost the
ame market with substitutable products. 
Particularly after the rise in Internet use among general house-
olds, many manufacturers that previously only distributed prod-
cts via a retail channel have added a direct channel. To manage
hese dual distribution channels successfully, different manufactur-
rs have adopted a variety of channel strategies. For instance, when
anufacturers, such as Daimler, Nikon, and Rubbermaid, ﬁrst com-
enced use of the direct channel, they used the Internet merely as
 medium to provide information about their products and/or to∗ Correspondence to: Graduate School of Business Administration , Kobe Univer- 
ity, 2-1, Rokkodaicho, Nada-ku, Kobe, Japan. Fax: + 81 78 803 6908. 
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377-2217/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uirect users to the nearest retailer carrying the product but with-
ut offering the product for sale directly, in order to avoid potential
hannel conﬂict. Consider the market for computer products. As an
xample, IBM redirected orders taken at ibm.com to its distributors
n an attempt to mitigate any conﬂict, while Hewlett-Packard pro-
ided their intermediaries with a commission fee for online orders
 Tsay & Agrawal, 2004a ). Compaq undertook a proﬁt-sharing strat-
gy whereby the company paid intermediaries an agent’s fee when
heir current clients purchased products on Compaq’s website ( Lee,
ee, & Larsen, 2003 ). Finally, in contrast to these manufacturers,
ell, a successful Internet marketer in the personal computer (PC)
arket, added its retail channel only after selling its products and
stablishing its brand through its direct channel. Dell opened kiosk
ocations in shopping malls across the US from 2002 and has op-
rated full-scale manufacturer-owned stores since late 2006 ( Zehr,
0 08 ). In 20 08, Dell expanded into retail stores, such as Wal-Mart
nd Best Buy, and shut down all of its US kiosks. 
In the context of multichannel management, the extent to
hich a manufacturer should set a direct price to maximize to-
al proﬁts across all channels has commanded signiﬁcant attention
rom both the academic and practical viewpoint. However, the ex-
sting operational research literature has neglected the question of
he timing at which the manufacturer should determine the di-nder the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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Z  rect price, even though it is a critical practical issue for manu-
facturers adopting a multichannel sales strategy. Consequently, this
paper investigates the timing problem when a manufacturer man-
aging dual-channel supply chains, comprising a retail channel and
a direct channel, should post its wholesale and direct prices us-
ing an observable-delay game framework recently developed in the
noncooperative game theory literature (e.g., Hamilton & Slutsky,
1990; van Damme & Hurkens, 1996, 1999, 2004 ). Put differently,
our main research questions are: 
• "When" does a manufacturer managing a dual-channel supply
chain set the wholesale and direct prices to maximize proﬁt,
and 
• "What" prices should the manufacturer set? 
Conventionally, operational research and management science
(OR/MS) models describing dual-channel supply chains examine
price competition where the retailer and the manufacturer simul-
taneously determine the retail and direct prices, respectively. In
contrast, our model demonstrates that such simultaneous price
competition never arises if the manufacturer and retailer can
choose not only the price level but also the timing of pricing. If
the manufacturer sets the direct price after setting the wholesale
price for the retailer, the retailer accelerates the timing of retail
pricing prior to the direct price setting by the manufacturer. Our
ﬁndings suggest that the manufacturer should post the direct price
before or upon, but not after, setting the wholesale price for the re-
tailer. Such upfront posting of the direct price not only constitutes
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the noncoopera-
tive game between channel members but also maximizes proﬁts
for the manufacturer. 
The logic behind this outcome is as follows. If the manufacturer
determines the direct price after setting the wholesale price for the
retailer, the direct price cannot fully reﬂect any future reaction by
the retailer, leading to a lower level of channel proﬁts. Conversely,
if the manufacturer determines the direct price before setting the
wholesale price, then the manufacturer can adjust the direct price
to its optimal level for both channels by predicting the future reac-
tions of the retailer, thus mitigating double marginalization in the
retail channel. This adjustment is the source of the advantages ac-
cruing to the manufacturer by posting the direct price before set-
ting the wholesale price. 
Nowadays, many manufacturers across a wide range of indus-
tries utilize both direct and indirect channels to distribute prod-
ucts. In the IT industry, IBM is often cited as a company that has
successfully managed the two types of channels over about three
decades. 1 The indirect channels of IBM, which include distribu-
tors, value-added resellers, and partners, can be regarded as the
retail channel in the model in this paper. Moreover, IBM is known
as a company that undertakes a channel strategy to launch sev-
eral new products only in the direct channel at ﬁrst, and subse-
quently through the indirect channel. The following are three ex-
amples of products distributed in this way. First, the RS/60 0 0, a re-
duced instruction set computer technology open system equipped
with a UNIX operating system, was a product initially sold through
the direct channel and subsequently through the indirect chan-1 Hardy and Magrath (1988 , pp. 65–66) state, "most makers of personal comput- 
ers desire the stability and strength of IBM’s Value Added Reseller (VAR) network. 
... In 1983, IBM executives decided they would have to use indirect channels rather 
than their own sales force to establish their personal computers in multiple mar- 
kets." Moreover, Cespedes and Corey (1990 , p. 71) write: "IBM, which had virtually 
no indirect channels as recently as 1981, was using more than 16 third-party chan- 
nels by the mid-1980s, including distributors, VARs, retail computer dealers, and 
a variety of ’complementary marketing organizations’ (ﬁrms with which IBM con- 
ducted marketing activities including joint sales presentations and product installa- 
tions)." 
2  
t
b
r
d
n
q
p
tel. 2 Second, the enterprise servers designated S/390 s were also
old through the IBM internal channel until 1997, and subsequently
ere distributed by qualiﬁed resellers, as discussed in Gandolfo
nd Padelletti (1999 , p. 110). Third, the sale of System x iDataPlex,
 relatively recent IBM product, was initially sold only directly and
ubsequently through partners. 3 Because selling and pricing tim-
ng of these products is different between the two channels, they
epresent appropriate real-world examples of our model. 
As discussed, the results of our model suggest that setting the
irect price before the wholesale price in the retail channel is the
est timing for the manufacturer. Therefore, if we interpret the
BM’s channel strategy using our model, IBM initially sells a new
roduct in its direct channel, thereby improving proﬁtability by
aking the direct price observable to its resellers, including its
artners. As such, our model provides a rationale for why a com-
any with dual channels, like IBM, makes the decision to sell a
ew product ﬁrst directly to buyers and subsequently through its
ndirect channel. Our model then effectively explains real-world
ases, including that of IBM, thereby providing useful managerial
nsights for manufacturers managing both retail and direct chan-
els. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
ection 2 provides a review of the literature relating to sup-
ly chain management from a game-theoretic perspective. In
ection 3 , we delineate the basic settings of our noncooperative
ame model. We then investigate when the manufacturer should
hoose the timing of setting the direct price and the wholesale
rice applicable to the retailer, identifying the relevant SPNE that
peciﬁes the choice of both the timing and level of prices. In
ection 4 , we extend our model to consider consumer behavior in
elation to services, especially because these and not goods receive
ncreasing attention in the supply chain management literature.
he ﬁnal section concludes the paper. 
. Literature review 
To date, many OR/MS studies have investigated supply chain
anagement problems from a noncooperative game theoretic per-
pective (e.g., Anderson & Bao, 2010; Atkins & Liang, 2010; Groznik
 Heese, 2010; Jeuland & Shugan, 1983; Kumoi & Matsubayashi,
014; Matsui, 2012; Matsushima & Mizuno, 2013; McGuire &
taelin, 1983; Parlar & Weng, 2006; Xia & Gilbert, 2007; Xie & Wei,
009; SeyedEsfahani, Biazaran, & Gharakhani, 2011; Wang et al.,
013; Zhou & Cao, 2013; Xiao et al., 2014 ). In particular, several
tudies have focused on the management of dual-channel supply
hains including direct marketers and conventional intermediaries,
uch as retailers, typically analyzing the economic impacts of the
ntroduction of a direct Internet channel (e.g., Balasubramanian,
998; Chiang, Chhajed, & Hess, 2003; Yao & Liu, 2003; Tsay &
grawal, 20 04a, 20 04b; Chiang & Monahan, 2005; Yao, Yue, Wang,
 Liu, 2005; Cattani, Gilland, Heese, & Swaminathan, 2006; Liu
t al . , 2006; Kurata, Yao, & Liu, 2007; Bernstein, Song, & Zheng,
008; Chen, Kaya, & Özer, 2008; Dumrongsiri, Fan, Jain, & Moin-
adeh, 2008; Mukhopadhyay, Zhu, & Yue, 2008; Cai, Zhang, &
hang, 20 09; Huang & Swaminathan, 20 09; Cai, 2010; Chiang,
010; Hua, Wang, & Cheng, 2010; Khouja & Wang, 2010; Ryan,2 Gandolfo and Padelletti (1999 , p. 110) conclude "Dealers are the main distribu- 
ion channel for RS/60 0 0s and PCs. Large quantities of these computers are directly 
ought from IBM, and since 1996 they have been bought from qualiﬁed ﬁrst-layer 
esellers." 
3 IBM (2008) notes "System x iDataPlex is announced as available through IBM 
irect sales channel only. It is currently not available through IBM Business Part- 
ers." Subsequently, Watts and Bachmaier (2012) state "iDataplex solutions are ac- 
uired either directly through IBM direct sales channels or through IBM business 
artners." These two documents prove that iDataPlex was initially sold only through 
he direct channel and then through the indirect channel. 
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4 Singh and Vives (1984) demonstrate that the linear demand function can be 
derived based on the following utility function, U , of a representative consumer: 
U = αD q D + αR q R – ( βD q D 2 + βR q R 2 + 2 ρ q D q R )/2. Given this utility, the con- 
sumer’s surplus denoted S is stated as: S = U–( p D q D + p R q R ) = αD q D + αR q R –
( βD q D 
2 + βR q R 2 + 2 ρ q D q R )/2 – p D q D – p R q R . The consumer maximizes S by 
solving ∂ S / ∂ q D =∂ S / ∂ q R =0. Then, we derive p D =αD – βD q D – ρq R and p R =αR 
– βR q R – ρq D . We may easily transform the inverse demand functions to de- 
mand functions, as represented by Eq. (1) . The corresponding parameters for the 
demand and inverse demand functions are as follows: αD = ( a D b R + θa R )/( b D b R –
θ2 ), βD =b R /( b D b R –θ2 ), αR = ( a R b D + θa D )/( b D b R –θ2 ), βR =b D /( b D b R –θ2 ), and 
ρ=θ /( b D b R –θ2 ). Ingene and Parry (2004) also explain the derivation of the 
linear demand function and its application to distribution channels or supply chain 
management. un, & Zhao, 2012; Xiong, Yan, Fernandes, Xiong, & Guo, 2012;
hen, Fang, & Wen, 2013; Hsiao & Chen, 2013; Moon & Yao, 2013;
alakrishnan, Sundaresan, & Zhang, 2014; Dan et al., 2014; Feng
 Geunes, 2014; Sun & Debo, 2014; Li, Lin, Xu, & Swain, 2015;
odríguez & Aydın, 2015; Cao, So, & Yin, 2016; Chen et al., 2016;
atsui, 2016 ). Balasubramanian (1998) investigates the compe-
ition between direct marketers and conventional retailers by
onsidering the adaptability of products to direct sales and the
roduct information revealed to customers. He shows that when
daptability is low, direct marketers are better off lowering the
evel of market information disseminated. Chiang et al. (2003) an-
lyze a manufacturer’s decision to sell directly over the Internet,
xclusively through a retailer, or through a mix of both approaches.
hey demonstrate that a direct channel helps the manufacturer to
mprove overall proﬁtability by mitigating ineﬃcient price double
arginalization. Liu, Gupta, and Zhang (2006) show that in the
arkets where retail price consistency across channels is manda-
ory, an incumbent traditional brick-and-mortar retailer can deter
he entry of a pure-play online retailer by strategically refraining
rom entering online. Alternatively, in the markets where price
onsistency is not a constraint, the incumbent can deter the entry
f a pure-play online retailer only if it enters online. In the case
f the latter, the incumbent is willing to cannibalize its own brick-
nd-mortar business by charging a low online price. Dumrongsiri
t al. (2008) investigate a dual-channel supply chain in which a
anufacturer sells to a retailer as well as to consumers directly.
hey show that the difference in marginal costs of the two chan-
els and demand variability play a major role in motivating the
anufacturer to open a direct channel. Huang and Swaminathan
2009) study optimal pricing strategies when sale of a product
s through two channels, such as the Internet and a traditional
hannel. They construct a deterministic demand model where
he demand for a given channel depends on prices, the degree of
ubstitution across channels, and the overall market potential, and
hey identify several prevalent pricing strategies that differ in the
egree of autonomy of the Internet channel. Wang, Niu, and Guo
2013) investigate a supply chain comprising an original equip-
ent manufacturer and a contract manufacturer by applying the
bservable delay game framework. They show that both parties
an prefer either Stackelberg leadership or followership depending
n multiple factors, including market size, the wholesale price, the
ercentage of outsourcing, and the degree to which products are
ubstitutable. The present paper is positioned as a contribution to
his line of research. 
There is another line of research closely related to the current
tudy: that is, the theoretical game literature that investigates the
mergence of the endogenous timing of strategies adopted by play-
rs. In a noncooperative game framework, whether players move
imultaneously or sequentially is important because an alternate
rder of moves often gives rise to signiﬁcantly different results.
or example, Gal-Or (1985) demonstrated that when two identi-
al players move sequentially in a noncooperative game, the player
ho moves ﬁrst (second) earns a higher payoff than the player
ho moves second (ﬁrst) if the reaction functions of the players
re downward (upward) sloping. In other words, there are inher-
nt ﬁrst- (second-) mover advantages when the strategy choice
f players is negatively (positively) related. Because such an ad-
antage stems from decision timing, it is now recognized that
he simultaneity versus the sequentiality of moves should be en-
ogenously determined by the players’ decisions ( Dowrick, 1986;
amilton & Slutsky, 1990 ). 
Even though the timing for posting the direct price is a crucial
roblem for manufacturers, as far as we are aware, no existing re-
earch examines the endogenous decision timing in a dual-channel
upply chain comprising not only the retail channel but also the
irect channel. From a multichannel management perspective, thisaper addresses the issue of the endogenous order of moves by
dopting the observable delay game framework (e.g., Hamilton &
lutsky, 1990; van Damme & Hurkens, 1996, 1999, 2004; Amir &
rilo, 1999; Amir & Stepanova, 2006 ). Therefore, it is worth not-
ng that the present paper is the ﬁrst to introduce the idea of an
bservable delay game into the research on dual-channel supply
hain management. 
. Model 
.1. Assumptions 
Initially, we present the settings underpinning our model.
able 1 lists the variables used in the model. Suppose that a man-
facturer produces a good at a variable cost of c per unit and sells
he product to consumers directly or through an independent re-
ailer. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , we deﬁne direct selling by the man-
facturer as the direct channel and selling through the retailer as
he retail channel. In the retail channel, the manufacturer sets the
holesale price per unit, r , and sells products to the retailer at this
rice. The retailer then resells the product, with the manufacturer
elegating the retail pricing decision to the retailer. 
As shown in Fig. 1 , we assume that the processing of a cus-
omer’s order is in a supply chain in which both the direct and
etail channels use a make-to-order (MTO) system because no
nventory-holding or shortage cost is included in our model. More-
ver, we assume that a customer sends his/her order directly to
ither the retailer in the retail channel or the manufacturer in the
irect channel. In the direct channel, the manufacturer commences
roduction after receiving an order from a customer and then de-
ivers a product to that customer. Meanwhile, after receiving an or-
er from a customer, the retailer resends the order to the manu-
acturer, receives the product from the manufacturer, and ﬁnally
ends it to the customer. Hence, the retailer plays the role of an
gent or mediator. In addition, the retailer plays an economic role
n expanding the market through product differentiation as we as-
ume the following demand functions for the two channels. 4 
 D = a D − b D p D + θ p R 
q R = a R − b R p R + θ p D (1) 
 and q are price and quantity, respectively, and subscripts D and R
ttached to p and q signify the direct and retail channels, respec-
ively. For example, q R represents the quantity sold by the retail
hannel. Hereafter, we refer to p D as the "direct channel price" and
 R as the "retail channel price". The parameters a D and a R repre-
ent the demand base, as measured by the market size potential
f the direct and retail channels, respectively. b D and b R are the
espective demand sensitivities to the prices of the two channels,
nd θ is the cross-price sensitivity of demand in one channel to
he price of the other channel. We assume that the parameters sat-
sfy the following inequalities: 
 > θ, b > θ, (2) 
504 K. Matsui / European Journal of Operational Research 258 (2017) 501–511 
Table 1 
Notations. 
p Price 
q Quantity 
r Wholesale price 
c Marginal cost 
a D Intercept of the demand function for the direct channel 
a R Intercept of the demand function for the retail channel 
b D Sensitivity of demand in the direct channel to the direct channel price 
b R Sensitivity of demand in the retail channel to the retail channel price 
θ Cross-price sensitivity between the channels 
γ D Decrease in demand in the direct channel in response to a unit service increase 
γ R Increase in demand in the retail channel in response to a unit service increase 
s Retailer’s service level 
C ( s ) Service cost function 
D Subscript that represents the direct channel 
R Subscript that represents the retail channel 
 Proﬁt for the manufacturer 
π Proﬁt for the retailer 
t r Period when the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price 
t pD Period when the manufacturer chooses the direct channel price 
t pR Period when the retailer chooses the retail channel price 
E Sequence where the manufacturer sets the direct channel price earlier than the price setting by the retailer 
S Sequence where the manufacturer sets the direct channel price simultaneously with the price setting by the retailer 
L Sequence where the manufacturer sets the direct channel price later than the price setting by the retailer 
Fig. 1. Channel description. 
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r  a D /c > b D − θ, a R /c > b R − θ . (3)
Inequality ( 2 ) indicates that the demand for a channel is more
sensitive to a change in the price of its channel than the price of
the other channel, which is a natural assumption. Inequality ( 3 )
ensures that in equilibrium the manufacturer distributes products
through both channels. 5 
The reason why we use simple linear demand functions de-
rived from consumer behavior demanding substitutable products
represented by Eq. (1) is to make our analysis consistent with re-
cent OR/MS studies. This facilitates easy comparison of the results
with previous work. Even recently, many studies that construct
dual-channel supply chain models under competitive environments
adopt linear demand functions derived from consumer behavior
demanding substitutable products without consideration of other
practical factors such as services (e.g., Cai, 2010; David & Adida,5 If Inequality ( 3 ) were not satisﬁed, the manufacturer would have an incentive 
to distribute products via either only the direct channel or the retail channel in 
equilibrium to avoid too serious cannibalization across the two competing channels. 
Indeed, if a D / c > b D –θ is satisﬁed, q D > 0 holds in equilibrium in all cases shown 
in Proposition 1 . Likewise, if a R / c > b R –θ is met, q R > 0 holds in all cases in the 
proposition. 
m  
N  
e
a
d015; Li et al . , 2015 ). Accordingly, we also employ a linear demand
chedule as represented by Eq. (1) . 6 
Based on the above settings, we consider the observable delay
ame proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , comprising two
tages. In stage one, the manufacturer and the retailer simultane-
usly announce the period in which they will choose their prices
nd are committed to this choice before they actually do so. In
tage two, following the announcement, the manufacturer and the
etailer choose their prices knowing when the rival will make their
rice choices. Because there are three control variables, r , p D , and
 R , we assume that the second stage is composed of three peri-
ds. 7 The manufacturer determines the wholesale price and the
irect channel price, and the retailer determines the retail chan-
el price in one of these three periods. 
To identify the timing of pricing, let t r , t pD , and t pR denote the
iming of setting the wholesale price, the direct channel price, and
he retail channel price, respectively. Because there are three pe-
iods in which the manufacturer and the retailer choose to deter-
ine each price, the three variables can take timings of 1, 2, or 3.
amely, in the ﬁrst stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses6 In Section 4 , we extend the model by introducing a retail service factor differ- 
ntiating products between the channels to consider a more practical environment. 
7 Lu (2006) constructs an observable-delay game model where three control vari- 
bles are determined in three periods. We employ the same setting of three-period 
iscrete timing to ensure consistency with preceding research, such as Lu (2006) . 
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Fig. 2. Timeline. 
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r r and t pD from {1, 2, 3} and the retailer chooses t pR from {1, 2, 3}.
s usually assumed in other supply chain studies (e.g., McGuire
 Staelin, 1983; Atkins & Liang, 2010 ), we assume that these
iming variables satisfy t r < t pR , such that the retailer sets the re-
ail channel price after observing the wholesale price set by the
anufacturer. 
.2. Results 
Using Eq. (1) , we state the proﬁts for the manufacturer, , and
etailer, π , as: 
= ( r − c ) q R + ( p D − c ) q D 
= ( r − c ) ( a R − b R p R + θ p D ) + ( p D − c ) ( a D − b D p D + θ p R ) (4) 
= ( p R − r ) q R 
= ( p R − r ) ( a R − b R p R + θ p D ) . (5) 
Using Eqs. (4) and ( 5 ), we derive the payoffs for the manufac-
urer and the retailer by the timing strategy at stage one in this
ame. Because stage two is composed of three periods when each
f three control variables, r , p D , and p R , is set, we need to consider
 
3 =27 combinations of the sequence of timings for the calcula-
ion of all possible payoffs. 8 Howe ver, the constraint t r < t pR indi-
ates that it is suﬃcient to investigate only nine combinations of
he sequence of timings. Moreover, through calculating the equi-
ibrium, we ﬁnd that while there are nine possible combinations
f timing sequences, there are only three instances of equilibrium
ayoffs and variables. Accordingly, we distinguish the equilibrium
ayoffs and variables using the "sequence" of the three prices be-
ng set. Let Sequences E, S, and L, respectively, denote that the
anufacturer sets the direct channel price earlier than, simultane-
usly with, and later than, the retail channel price setting by the
etailer, as Fig. 2 illustrates. We deﬁne Sequence E as the sequence
here the timing variables are ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 3),
1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3), or (2, 2, 3), because t pD < t pR holds in all these
ombinations. We deﬁne Sequence S as the sequence where the
iming variables are ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 2, 2), (1, 3, 3), or (2, 3, 3) be-
ause t pD = t pR holds. Finally, we deﬁne Sequence L as the sequence
here the timing variables are ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 3, 2) because t pD 
 t pR holds. Hereafter, we attach superscripts E, S, or L on equi-
ibrium payoffs and variables to identify the sequence of timings.
he following proposition shows the equilibrium outcomes by the
equence. (The Appendix provides all proofs.) 
roposition 1. The equilibrium values of the payoffs and endogenous
ariables are as follows by sequence. 8 For a more detailed explanation of this formulation, see Table 1 in Lu (2006 , 
p. 58–59). ase. (I): Sequence E 
r E = ( Y R / B 0 + c ) / 2 
p E D = ( Y D / B 0 + c ) / 2 
p E R = ( Y R / B 0 + c ) / 2 + X R / ( 4 b R ) 
q E D = X D / 2 + θX R / ( 4 b R ) 
q E R = X R / 4 
π E = X 2 R / ( 16 b R ) 
E = ( Y D − B 0 c ) 2 / ( 4 b R B 0 ) + X 2 R / ( 8 b R ) 
ase. (II): Sequence S 
r S = ( Y R / B 0 + c ) / 2 − θ2 X R / ( 2 b R B 1 ) 
p S D = ( Y D / B 0 + c ) / 2 + θX R / B 1 
p S R = ( Y R / B 0 + c ) / 2 + 
(
4 b D b R + θ2 
)
X R / ( 2 b R B 1 ) 
q S D = X D / 2 + θ
(
2 b D b R + θ2 
)
X R / ( 2 b R B 1 ) 
q S R = 
(
2 b D b R + θ2 
)
X R / B 1 
π S = 
(
2 b D b R + θ2 
)2 
X 2 R / 
(
b R B 
2 
1 
)
S = ( Y D − B 0 c ) 2 / ( 4 b R B 0 ) + b D X 2 R / B 1 
ase. (III): Sequence L 
r L = ( Y R / B 0 + c ) / 2 − b D θ2 X R / ( 2 B 2 ) 
p L D = ( Y D / B 0 + c ) / 2 + θ
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
)
X R / ( 2 B 2 ) 
p L R = ( Y R / B 0 + c ) / 2 + b D 
(
4 b D b R − θ2 
)
X R / ( 2 B 2 ) 
q L D = X D / 2 + b 2 D b R θX R / B 2 
q L R = b D b R 
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
)
X R / B 2 
π L = 2 b 3 D b 2 R 
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
)
X 2 R /B 
2 
2 
L = ( Y D − B 0 c ) 2 / ( 4 b R B 0 ) + 
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
)2 
X 2 R / ( 4 b R B 2 ) 
The symbols included in the values respectively represent the fol-
owing: Y D ≡ b R a D + θa R , Y R ≡ b D a R + θa D , X D ≡ a D – ( b D –θ ) c, X R 
a R –( b R –θ ) c, B 0 ≡ b D b R –θ2 , B 1 ≡ 8 b D b R + θ2 , and B 2 ≡ 8 b D 2 b R 2 –
 b D b R θ
2 + θ4 . 
By comparing the equilibrium variables in Proposition 1 , we de-
ive the following proposition. 
roposition 2. The following relationships concerning the equilib-
ium payoffs and variables hold. 
E > S > L 
E < π S < π L 
 
E > r S > r L 
p E D < p 
S 
D < p 
L 
D 
p E R < p 
S 
R < p 
L 
R 
The following corollary follows from Proposition 2. 
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Table 2 
Payoff matrix. 
Notes: The left variable in parenthesis represents the manufacturer’s payoff, and the right variable in parenthesis represents the retailer’s payoff
from each combination of timing strategies. The payoff enclosed by a circle represents the best response for the manufacturer or the retailer. 
Hence, the cell where both of the two payoffs in parenthesis are circled constitutes the Nash equilibrium. The cells with diagonal lines are the 
combinations of strategies that are never realized because t r < t pR must hold in this timing game. See Proposition 1 for the values of payoffs, 
E , S , L , π E , π S , and π L . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r  
r
3
 
p  
t  
c  
p  
m  
m  
a  
g  
a  
a  
b  
s  
t  
c  
b  
e  
c  
m  
e  
s  
c  
t
 
t  
p  
p  
E  
s  
r  
w  
t  
9 Price competition and quantity competition are respectively called Bertrand 
competition and Cournot competition in the economic literature. Corollary 1. The equilibrium margin for the retailer is higher when
the manufacturer sets the direct channel price later; that is: 
p E R − r E < p S R − r S < p L R − r L . 
We may identify the optimal timing strategy for the manufac-
turer and that for the retailer at stage one using the results of
Proposition 2 . For tractability of the results, we construct the pay-
off matrix of the timing game at stage one and present the Nash
equilibrium in the following observation. 
Observation. Table 2 illustrates the payoff matrix at stage one. The
cell where both of the payoffs in parenthesis are circled constitutes
the Nash equilibrium in the timing game. 
Note that we use diagonal lines in the cells in Table 2 to in-
dicate where the combinations of timing strategies do not satisfy
t r < t pR . For ease of identifying the optimal timing strategy, we
circle the payoff in Table 2 resulting from the optimal strategy. Be-
cause the left variable in parenthesis represents the manufacturer’s
payoff and the right variable the retailer’s payoff, the cell where we
circle both of the payoffs in parenthesis constitutes the Nash equi-
librium in the timing game, as stated in the observation. We draw
the following proposition by referring to the table. 
Proposition 3. The combinations of timings that constitute the SPNE
are: ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 3), (2, 1, 3), or (2, 2, 3) , all of which
correspond to Sequence E. This suggests that the manufacturer sets the
direct channel price (i) before or upon setting the wholesale price, and
(ii) before the retailer sets the retail channel price in equilibrium. 
Proposition 3 is the central ﬁnding in this paper and pro-
vides the managerial implication that the manufacturer should
post the direct channel price as early as possible. Observe that
t pD < t pR holds in every combination of timings in Proposition 3 ,
indicating that only Sequence E constitutes the SPNE. Moreover,
Proposition 3 and Table 2 suggest that if the manufacturer sets
the direct channel price after setting the wholesale price (i.e., t r 
< t pD ), no Nash equilibrium arises because the retailer has an in-
centive to accelerate the timing of retail pricing so that t pR ≤ t pD 
holds. For example, Table 2 suggests that if the manufacturer sets
( t r , t pD ) = (1, 2) or (1, 3), the retailer sets t pR =2, meaning that theetailer prefers the earlier period to the later period for setting the
etail channel price. 
.3. Rationale 
Next, we reveal the mechanism that underlies our model to
rovide a rationale for our result and implication. To understand
he logic of the mechanism, we ﬁrst need to understand the con-
epts of "strategic complements" and "strategic substitutes" pro-
osed by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) , as com-
only used in noncooperative game theory. "Strategic comple-
ents" means that if a player increases its strategic variable in
 noncooperative game, another player also increases its strate-
ic variable in response. Stated differently, if a player undertakes
 more (less) aggressive strategy, the other player also undertakes
 more (less) aggressive strategy, implying a positive correlation
etween the strategic variables determined by players. "Strategic
ubstitutes" is the direct opposite of "strategic complements", such
hat if one player increases its strategic variable, another player de-
reases its strategic variable. Therefore, the variables characterized
y strategic substitutes have a negative correlation. The existing lit-
rature shows that prices determined by multiple ﬁrms in price
ompetition are strategic complements, whereas quantities deter-
ined in quantity competition are strategic substitutes (e.g., Bulow
t al., 1985 ). 9 Because we consider price competition in this analy-
is, strategic variables (prices) are strategic complements. Using the
oncept of strategic complements in price competition, we explore
he intuition behind our outcomes by pricing sequence. 
First, let us consider Sequence E, which brings the manufac-
urer the highest proﬁt, as suggested by Proposition 2 . Note that
 R has no strategic inﬂuence on p D in Sequence E. This is because
 R is derived as the best-response function including p D and r (i.e.,
q. (A1) in the Appendix) in a later period, and the manufacturer
ubstitutes this function into its proﬁt function in an earlier pe-
iod and maximizes the function (i.e., Eq. (A2) in the Appendix), in
hich p R no longer appears. That is, the manufacturer perfectly an-
icipates the retailer’s subsequent pricing strategy and thus can ad-
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11 The following insight from Moorthy and Fader (1989) reinforces our result; they 
show that the margin decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer are strate- 
gic substitutes in a competitive environment in a two-echelon supply chain. In our 
model, the manufacturer’s margin in the retail channel is r –c and the retailer’s mar- 
gin is p R –r . Because the marginal cost of the product for the manufacturer in our 
model is ﬁxed as c , r E –c > r S –c > r L –c suggested by Proposition 2 and p R 
E –r E < p R 
S –
r S < p R 
L –r L in Corollary 1 indicate a negative correlation between the two margins, 
which is consistent with the ﬁnding in Moorthy and Fader (1989) . 
12 While a number of previous studies of dual-channel supply chain management 
apply this type of demand function (e.g., Hua et al., 2010; Hu & Li, 2012; Chen 
et al., 2013 ), the demand functions in Dan et al. (2012) are most similar to Eq. (6) . 
Yan and Pei (2009) detail the consumer behavior underpinning this type of demand 
function where they assume that heterogeneous consumers are along a line and 
that consumers have different product values according to their position on the line. 
Moreover, Yan and Pei (2009) assume that each consumer obtains additional utility ust the direct channel price as its optimal level in an earlier stage
hrough backward induction. Indeed, Proposition 1 suggests that
he direct channel price in Sequence E ( p D 
E ) is (( b R a D + θa R )/( b D b R 
θ2 ) + c )/2, which is the monopoly price level for the manufac-
urer in the direct channel under the absence of inﬂuence from
he retail channel. Such upfront optimization enables the manu-
acturer to glean the highest proﬁt from the direct channel, which
s a more important proﬁt source than the retail channel because
ouble marginalization does not arise in the direct channel. 
Second, we consider Sequence S. Because p D and p R are set si-
ultaneously in this sequence, unlike Sequence E, a strategic effect
rises between the two prices. In a competition with two ﬁrms,
ach ﬁrm hopes that the other ﬁrm behaves less aggressively. Be-
ause strategic variables (i.e., p D and p R ) work as strategic comple-
ents in price competition as discussed, each ﬁrm must undertake
 less aggressive strategy because the other ﬁrm then will also un-
ertake a less aggressive strategy. Therefore, the manufacturer (re-
ailer) has the incentive to drive up the direct (retail) channel price
n equilibrium, which is less aggressive behavior than a price re-
uction, to induce the rival to be less aggressive and to raise its
rice. This behavior induces the equilibrium price to approach the
evel that maximizes the total proﬁt for the two ﬁrms as if they
ere colluding, because in price competition, the less aggressive
trategy by one player increases not only its own proﬁt but also
he rival’s proﬁt ( Bulow et al., 1985 ). As a result, p D and p R in equi-
ibrium take higher values in Sequence S than in Sequence E; that
s, p D 
E < p D 
S and p R 
E < p R 
S hold as shown by Proposition 2. 
Next, because the direct channel price and the retail channel
rice in Sequence S ( p D 
S and p R 
S ) are higher than their respec-
ive optimal levels ( p D 
E and p R 
E ), the sales quantities in the di-
ect channel and the retail channel are lower in Sequence S than
n Sequence E. If the manufacturer did not change the level of
he wholesale price from r E in this situation, the sales quantity
n each channel would decrease from the ﬁrst-best level realized
n Sequence E, and proﬁt would fall. To recover this suboptimal
tatus as much as possible, the manufacturer then needs to in-
rease the quantity dealt by the retailer. To induce the retailer to
eal a greater quantity, the manufacturer then has to cut down
he wholesale price ( r ) in sequence S below the price in sequence
 ( r E ). As a result, r E > r S holds. 
Third, we consider sequence L. At the last move in Sequence L,
he manufacturer sets the direct channel price by referring to the
etail channel price set earlier. Because prices are strategic comple-
ents, the manufacturer tends to drive up the direct channel price
n Sequence L, in a way similar to Sequence S. Moreover, when
he retailer sets the retail channel price ( p R ) in an earlier period,
he retailer calculates that the manufacturer will slightly under-
ut p R in order to obtain a larger market share than the retailer.
his calculation puts pressure on the retailer to maintain a high
rice to avoid having the manufacturer set a very low price. As a
esult, the retailer undertakes an even less aggressive strategy in
he sequential-move game (Sequence L) than in the simultaneous-
ove game (Sequence S). 10 Hence, both the manufacturer and the
etailer set prices above the levels in the simultaneous-move game,
uch that p R 
S < p R 
L and p D 
S < p D 
L hold. These two inequalities
ean that the higher prices further reduce sales quantities in both
f the channels in Sequence L compared with Sequence S, which in
urn reduces the manufacturer’s proﬁt. To mitigate this sales quan-
ity decline as much as possible, the manufacturer has to reduce10 The explanation of the logic here is based on Shy (1996 , p. 142). Texts on in- 
ustrial organization generally provide more detailed explanation and illustration of 
he mechanism that each equilibrium price of two competitors in a sequential-move 
ame is higher than that in a simultaneous-move game (i.e., p R 
S < p R 
L and p D 
S < 
 D 
L ). See, for example, Shy (1996 , pp. 141–142) or Belleﬂamme and Peitz (2010 , pp. 
8–79). 
b
c
r
c
u
b
C
fhe wholesale price, r , below r S to induce the retailer to deal in
reater quantity. As a result, r S > r L holds. Combining r S > r L and
 R 
S < p R 
L leads to p R 
S –r S < p R 
L –r L . Eventually, p R 
E –r E < p R 
S –r S <
 R 
L –r L suggests that the retailer gains a higher margin as the man-
facturer sets the direct channel price in a later period. That is,
ouble marginalization is more noticeable in the sequence order-
ng of L, S, and E, as shown in Corollary 1. 11 
. Extension: introduction of service factor 
Recently, Wang, Wallace, Shen, and Choi (2015) give an exten-
ive overview of research in the supply chain management of ser-
ices, suggesting that services provided by retailers can have a sub-
tantial impact on consumer behavior. Given this research stream,
n this section we extend the model in the previous section to
onsider consumer behavior demanding products with differenti-
ted services between channels. Following recent OR studies that
onstruct dual-channel models involving a service factor, we mod-
fy the demand functions for Eq. (1) in the basic model to the
ollowing. 
 D = a D − b D p D + θ p R − γD s 
q R = a R − b R p R + θ p D + γR s (6) 
here s is the level of service provided by the retailer. The pos-
tive parameters γ R and γ D respectively measure the increase in
emand in the retail channel and the decrease of demand in the
irect channel, in response to a unit increase in service. Hence,
q. (6) indicates that as the retailer enhances the service level, de-
and for the retail channel increases while demand for the direct
hannel decreases. 12 We also assume a strictly convex service cost
unction, C ( s ), for the retailer incurring the cost of services, so that
 (0) = 0, dC ( s )/ ds > 0, and dC 2 ( s )/ ds 2 > 0 hold following the extant
iterature (e.g., Tsay & Agrawal, 2004a; Yan & Pei, 2009; Dan, Xu,
 Liu, 2012 ). 13 Accordingly, the respective proﬁts for the manufac-
urer and the retailer are: 
= ( r − c ) q R + ( p D − c ) q D 
= ( r − c ) ( a R − b R p R + θ p D + γR s ) 
+ ( p D − c ) ( a D − b D p D + θ p R − γD s ) (7) 
= ( p R − r ) q R −C ( s ) 
= ( p R − r ) ( a R − b R p R + θ p D + γR s ) −C ( s ) . (8) 
The next proposition holds in the extended model. y receiving services from the retailer. Yan and Pei (2009) demonstrate that this 
onsumer behavior setting leads to this type of demand function form, in which 
etailer service level linearly increases the demand for the retail channel while de- 
reasing the demand for the direct channel. Because consumers have different val- 
es of willingness to purchase, such demand function forms draw on heterogeneous 
ut not representative consumers. 
13 While previous studies often assume a quadratic service cost function such as 
 ( s ) = ηs 2 /2 where η > 0, we need not restrict the cost function to such a speciﬁc 
orm because our central result holds even for a general cost function. 
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d  Proposition 4. The equilibrium payoffs by sequence are as follows. 
Case. (I): Sequence E 
E = ( Y D − s ( b R γD − θγR ) − B 0 c ) 2 / ( 4 b R B 0 ) + ( X R + s γR ) 2 / ( 8 b R ) 
π E = ( X R + s γR ) 2 / ( 16 b R ) −C ( s ) 
Case. (II): Sequence S 
S = ( Y D − s ( b R γD − θγR ) − B 0 c ) 2 / ( 4 b R B 0 ) + b D ( X R + s γR ) 2 / B 1 
π S = 
(
2 b D b R + θ2 
)2 
( X R + s γR ) 2 / 
(
b R B 
2 
1 
)
−C ( s ) 
Case. (III): Sequence L 
L = ( Y D − s ( b R γD − θγR ) − B 0 c ) 2 / ( 4 b R B 0 ) 
+ ( X R + s γR ) 2 
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
)2 
/ ( 4 b R B 2 ) 
π L = 2 b 3 D b 2 R ( X R + s γR ) 2 
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
)
/B 2 2 −C ( s ) 
The symbols included in the payoffs respectively represent the fol-
lowing: Y D ≡ b R a D + θa R , X R ≡ a R –( b R –θ ) c, B 0 ≡ b D b R –θ2 , B 1 ≡
8 b D b R + θ2 , and B 2 ≡ 8 b D 2 b R 2 –5 b D b R θ2 + θ4 . 
Note that in Proposition 4 , we can interpret s as either an ex-
ogenously ﬁxed parameter or a control variable endogenously de-
termined by the retailer. If we adopt the latter interpretation, the
retailer maximizes π by solving ∂ π / ∂ s = 0 and derives the optimal
service level, s ∗, as the function of exogenous parameters: s ∗ =s ( a R ,
b D , b R , γ R , c , θ ). We then substitute this optimal service level, s 
∗,
into each payoff function in Proposition 4 , deriving the equilibrium
payoffs after controlling for the service level of the retailer. The
next proposition follows from Proposition 4. 
Proposition 5. The following relationships concerning the equilib-
rium payoffs hold in the extended model. 
E > S > L 
π E < π S < π L 
Using Proposition 5 , we can construct a payoff matrix like
Table 2 . Because the order of payoffs classiﬁed by the sequence
in Proposition 5 is identical to that in Proposition 2 , we identify
Sequence E as the SPNE based on the payoff matrix that suggests
the equilibria are the same as those in Table 2. 
Recall in Proposition 4 that s can be either an exogenously ﬁxed
parameter or an endogenous control variable in equilibrium that
the retailer determines. For example, suppose that s S 
∗
is the opti-
mal service level for the retailer that maximizes its proﬁt in Se-
quence S, π S . Even when s is ﬁxed as s S 
∗
, Proposition 5 suggests
that π S < π L holds, meaning that the retailer obtains at least the
maximum proﬁt of Sequence S when choosing Sequence L. Hence,
E > S > L and πE < π S < π L hold regardless of whether the
retailer’s proﬁt has been maximized with respect to the service or
not. In either case, Sequence E constitutes the equilibrium. 
Proposition 6. Only Sequence E arises in the SPNE when consumer
behavior depends on the retailer’s service, suggesting that the man-
ufacturer sets the direct channel price (i) before or upon setting the
wholesale price, and (ii) before the retailer sets the retail channel price
in equilibrium. 
Proposition 6 proves that even when retailer service is consid-
ered as an additional practical factor affecting consumer behavior,
the central result of the basic model in the previous section re-
mains to hold. Namely, the result that the manufacturer has an
advantage in posting the direct price before the wholesale price
is robust under circumstances that are more general. . Conclusion and discussion 
This paper investigates the problem of when a manufacturer
anaging dual-channel supply chains should set its selling prices.
he most notable conclusion from our analysis is that a manufac-
urer that seeks to maximize its proﬁt should determine the di-
ect price before or upon setting the wholesale price to a retailer.
onversely, if the manufacturer sets the direct price in a period
fter setting the wholesale price, there is no stable equilibrium
egarding the timing of price determination by the manufacturer
nd retailer. Therefore, price competition where the retail and di-
ect channel prices are set simultaneously never occurs, but only
 sequential price-setting game arises, in which the manufacturer
nitially sets the direct and wholesale prices, and the retailer then
etermines the retail price. 
Our result is also noteworthy from the viewpoint of noncoop-
rative game theory. It has been widely acknowledged that price
ompetition is characterized by a second-mover advantage under
uite general conditions; that is, the later a player makes its deci-
ion, the greater the payoff it receives ( Gal-or, 1985; Shy, 1996 , pp.
41–142; Belleﬂamme & Peitz, 2010 , pp. 78–79). Contrary to this
onventional insight, our model indicates that both the manufac-
urer and the retailer have an incentive to expedite the timing of
he pricing decision to improve their own proﬁts in a game within
 multichannel structure, which appears to constitute a ﬁrst-mover
dvantage. However, note that the "ﬁrst mover" discussed here
epresents the ﬁrst mover not in the "whole game", but in the
subgame" where the manufacturer and the retailer respectively
et the direct channel price and the retail channel price. Accord-
ngly, the "ﬁrst-mover advantage" suggested does not result from
he whole game but rather from the subgame where p D and p R are
et. In the whole game of this dual-channel problem, the manufac-
urer is ﬁxed as the ﬁrst mover, whereas the retailer is the sec-
nd mover, because the retailer can set the retail channel price,
 R , after observing the manufacturer’s setting the wholesale price,
 . This means that the manufacturer can always adjust the whole-
ale price r , in an earlier stage based on the anticipation of re-
ailer’s subsequent pricing behavior. This upfront adjustment of r
y the manufacturer is the fundamental reason for the disappear-
nce of the second-mover advantage in the subsequent subgame.
herefore, if the manufacturer postpones setting the direct chan-
el price by espousing the conventional insight, the manufacturer
ill collect lower proﬁts. Our study suggests that a manufacturer
ust be aware of this opposing insight; i.e., a later-mover disad-
antage stemming from posting the direct channel price after the
etailer sets the retail channel price in the subgame. 
Our research from the game-theoretic point of view proposes
hat the timing of pricing in each channel is an essential prob-
em for a manufacturer that employs dual channels. As brieﬂy dis-
ussed in the introduction, our model describes past pricing deci-
ions in dual channels made by PC manufacturers such as Dell and
BM. While most PC manufacturers that initially distributed their
roducts through a traditional retail channel subsequently con-
tructed a direct channel, Dell originally used only a direct chan-
el and subsequently added a retail channel, which means that
ell established the direct price before determining the wholesale
rice in the retail channel. To be exact, upfront setting of the di-
ect price by the manufacturer (Dell) worked as a commitment,
hich changed the subsequent behavior of retail pricing by re-
ailers. Moreover, IBM undertook the channel strategy to distribute
everal products initially only through the direct channel, and then
hrough the indirect channel, including its partners, as discussed
n the introduction. Evaluating IBM’s dual-channel strategy, Hardy
nd Magrath (1988 , p. 66) declare "The company has been quite
uccessful; large customers can buy direct, while smaller, more
ispersed customers buy from distribution channels." This means
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l  hat IBM is a manufacturer that has successfully used dual chan-
els. Our model suggests that the policy of differentiating the tim-
ng of pricing and distribution between the two channels is one of
he factors that enhanced its proﬁtability. Hence, these cases are
onsistent with our result that a manufacturer can pursue greater
roﬁt by setting the direct channel price before setting the whole-
ale price, as shown in Propositions 3 and 6. 
As coordination between a multi-channel manufacturer and a
raditional retailer commands the interest of researchers and prac-
itioners, we can develop our model to incorporate other factors
ssociated with actual business environments. For example, we
ay extend the observable delay game model in this paper by in-
roducing competition between multiple manufacturers managing
ual-channel supply chains. Moreover, while considering the MTO
ystem in our model, we can introduce contracts between supply
hain members including two-part tariffs or a buyback/return pol-
cy employed by the manufacturer to coordinate the traditional re-
ailer. 14 We reserve these topics for future study. 
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ppendix 
roof of Proposition 1. We solve the game in a backward manner
y the sequence of pricing timing. 
Case (I): when ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 3), (1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3),
r (2, 2, 3) 
At ﬁrst glance, the order in which prices are set varies among
hese ﬁve sequences of timings and thus leads to different payoffs.
owever, we later prove that every combination of these timing
trategies leads to the same payoffs because of the envelope theo-
em by further dividing this case into three cases; i.e., Case (I)-(i),
ii), and (iii), below. 
The retailer sets the retail channel price at the last move be-
ause t pR > t r and t pR > t pD hold in this case. Using the backward
nduction technique, we ﬁrst maximize Eq. (5) with respect to p R 
y solving ∂ π / ∂ p R =0, yielding: 
p R = ( a R + b R r + θ p D ) / ( 2 b R ) . (A1) 
Note that the second-order conditions for all maximization
roblems in this appendix are satisﬁed because all proﬁt functions
re concave and quadratic with respect to the strategic variable
price). Therefore, we henceforth omit writing the second-order
onditions. 14 OR models that focus on the economic roles of return policies used between 
anufacturers and distributors appear in the supply chain management literature 
e.g., Matsui, 2010; Ohmura & Matsuo, 2016 ). 

θ  
t  
tNext, we analyze the manufacturer’s decision on the direct
hannel price. We put Eq. (A1) into Eq. (4) , yielding: 
= ( r − c ) ( a R − b R r + θ p D ) / 2 
+ ( p D − c ) ( a D − b D p D + θ ( a R + b R r + θ p D ) / ( 2 b R ) ) . (A2) 
We derive the equilibrium by each of the three cases, such that
he manufacturer sets the direct channel price (i) before, (ii) upon,
nd (iii) after setting the wholesale price. 
Case (I)-(i): when ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (2, 1, 3) 
The manufacturer sets the direct channel price before setting
he wholesale price in this case. We maximize Eq. (A2) with re-
pect to r by solving ∂ / ∂ r = 0, yielding: 
 = ( a R + 2 θ p D + ( b R − θ ) c ) / ( 2 b R ) . (A3) 
Subsequently, we put Eq. (A3) into Eq. (A2) and maximize it on
 D by solving ∂ / ∂ p D =0, obtaining: 
p D = 
(
( b R a D + θa R ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 . (A4) 
Replacing p D in Eq. (A3) with Eq. (A4) , we have: 
 = 
(
( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 . (A5)
Plugging Eqs. (A4) and ( A5 ) into Eq. (A1) yields: 
p R = ( a R + ( b R + θ ) c ) / ( 4 b R ) + ( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
2 
(
b D b R − θ2 
))
. 
(A6) 
Case (I)-(ii): when ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 3), or (2, 2, 3) 
In these three combinations, the manufacturer sets the direct
hannel price simultaneously with setting the wholesale price.
ence, we maximize Eq. (A2) with respect to both r and p D by
olving ∂ / ∂ r = ∂ / ∂ p D =0, obtaining: 
r = 
(
( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 , 
p D = 
(
( b R a D + θa R ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 . (A7) 
Putting Eq. (A7) into ( A1 ) yields: 
p R = ( a R + ( b R + θ ) c ) / ( 4 b R ) + ( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
2 
(
b D b R − θ2 
))
. 
(A8) 
Case (I)-(iii): when ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 2, 3) 
In this case, the manufacturer sets the direct channel price af-
er setting the wholesale price but before the retail channel price
s set. We maximize Eq. (A2) on p D by solving ∂ / ∂ p D =0, which
ields: 
p D = ( 2 b R a D + θ ( a R + b R ( 2 r − c ) ) ) / 
(
2 
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
))
+ c/ 2 . (A9)
Inserting Eq. (A9) into Eq. (A2) and maximizing it with respect
o r by solving ∂ / ∂ r = 0 gives: 
 = 
(
( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 . (A10)
Replacing r in Eq. (A9) with Eq. (A10) , we have: 
p D = 
(
( b R a D + θa R ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 . (A11) 
Plugging Equations ( A10 ) and ( A11 ) into Eq. (A1) yields: 
p R = ( a R + ( b R + θ ) c ) / ( 4 b R ) + ( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
2 
(
b D b R − θ2 
))
. 
(A12) 
Finally, we insert either Eqs. (A4) –( A6 ) of Case (I)-(i),
qs. (A7) –( A8 ) of Case (I)-(ii), or Equations ( A10 )–( A12 )
f Case (I)-(iii) into Eqs. (4) and ( 5 ), yielding the equi-
ibrium proﬁts for the manufacturer and the retailer as:
= ( b R a D + θa R − ( b D b R − θ2 ) c ) 2 / ( 4 b R ( b D b R − θ2 ) ) + ( a R − ( b R −
) c) 2 / ( 8 b R ) and π = ( a R − ( b R − θ ) c ) 2 / ( 16 b R ) , which correspond
o E and πE in Table 2 . Notice that the envelope theorem leads
o the same equilibrium values in Cases (I)-(i), (ii), and (iii). 
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C  Case (II): when ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 2, 2), (1, 3, 3), or (2, 3, 3) 
Maximization of Eq. (4) on p D and Eq. (5) on p R , i.e.,
∂ / ∂ p D =∂ π / ∂ p R =0, gives: 
p D = ( 2 b R ( a D + b D c ) + θ ( a R + b R ( 3 r − 2 c ) ) ) / 
(
4 b D b R − θ2 
)
p R = ( 2 b D ( a R + b R r ) + θ ( a D + θ r + ( b D − θ ) c ) ) / 
(
4 b D b R − θ2 
)
. 
(A13)
Inserting Eq. (A13) into Eq. (4) and maximizing it with respect
to r by solving ∂ / ∂ r = 0 gives: 
r = 
(
( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 
−θ2 ( a R − ( b R − θ ) c ) / 
(
2 b R 
(
8 b D b R + θ2 
))
. (A14)
Finally, inserting Equations ( A13 ) and ( A14 ) into Eqs. (4) and
( 5 ) yields the equilibrium proﬁts for the manufacturer and the
retailer as:  = ( b R a D + θa R − ( b D b R − θ2 ) c ) 2 / ( 4 b R ( b D b R − θ2 ) ) +
b D ( a R − ( b R − θ ) c ) 2 / ( 8 b D b R + θ2 ) and π = ( 2 b D b R + θ2 ) 2 ( a R −
( b R − θ ) c) 2 / ( b R ( 8 b D b R + θ2 ) 2 ) , which correspond to S and π S in
Table 2. 
Case (III): when ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 3, 2) 
Maximization of Eq. (4) with respect to p D by solving
∂ / ∂ p D =0 gives: 
p D = ( a D + b D c + θ ( p R + r − c ) ) / ( 2 b D ) . (A15)
Replacing p D in Eq. (5) with Eq. (A15) and maximizing it on p R 
by solving ∂ π / ∂ p R =0 yields: 
p R = ( 2 b D ( a R + b R r ) + θ ( a D + ( b D − θ ) c ) ) / 
(
2 
(
2 b D b R − θ2 
))
. 
(A16)
Inserting Equations ( A15 ) and ( A16 ) into Eq. (4) and maximizing
it with respect to r by solving ∂ / ∂ r = 0 gives: 
r = 
(
( b D a R + θa D ) / 
(
b D b R − θ2 
)
+ c 
)
/ 2 
−b D θ2 ( a R − ( b R − θ ) c ) / 
(
2 
(
8 b 2 D b 
2 
R − 5 b D b R θ2 + θ4 
))
. (A17)
Finally, inserting Equations ( A15 ), ( A16 ), and ( A17 ) into
Eqs. (4) and ( 5 ) yields the equilibrium proﬁts for the manufacturer
and the retailer as: 
= ( b R ( a D − b D c ) + θ ( a R + θc ) ) 2 / ( 4 b R ( b D b R − θ2 ) ) 
+ ( a R −( b R −θ ) c ) 2 
(
2 b D b R −θ2 
)2 
/ 
(
4 b R 
(
8 b 2 D b 
2 
R −5 b D b R θ2 + θ4 
))
and π = 2 b 3 
D 
b 2 R ( a R − ( b R − θ ) c ) 2 ( 2 b D b R − θ2 ) / (8 b 2 D b 2 R − 5 b D b R θ2 
+ θ4 ) 2 , which correspond to L and π L in Table 2 . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the values in Proposition 1 , we de-
rive the following series of inequalities. The deﬁnitions of X R , B 1 ,
and B 2 in the inequalities are in Proposition 1 . Note that the signs
of the inequalities are determined using the assumptions repre-
sented by Inequalities ( 2 )–( 3 ). 
E − S = θ2 X 2 R / ( 8 b R B 1 ) > 0 
S − L = θ2 
(
8 b 2 D b 
2 
R − θ4 
)
X 2 R / ( 4 b R B 1 B 2 ) > 0 
π E − π S = −3 θ2 
(
16 b D b R + 5 θ2 
)
X 2 R / 
(
16 b R B 
2 
1 
)
< 0 
π S − π L = −θ4 
(
64 b 4 D b 
4 
R − 46 b 3 D b 3 R θ2 
−5 b 2 D b 2 R θ4 + 6 b D b R θ6 − θ8 
)
X 2 R / 
(
b R B 
2 
1 B 
2 
2 
)
< 0 
r E − r S = θ2 X R / ( 2 b R B 1 ) > 0 
r S − r L = θ4 
(
6 b D b R − θ2 
)
X R / ( 2 b R B 1 B 2 ) > 0 p E D − p S D = −θX R / B 1 < 0 
p S D − p L D = −θ3 
(
4 b D b R − 3 θ2 
)
X R / ( 2 B 1 B 2 ) < 0 
p E R − p S R = −θ2 X R / ( 4 b R B 1 ) < 0 
p S R − p L R = −θ2 
(
8 b 2 D b 
2 
R − θ4 
)
X R / ( 2 b R B 1 B 2 ) < 0 

roof of Corollary 1. Because Proposition 2 suggests that r E > r S 
 r L and p R 
E < p R 
S < p R 
L hold, it follows that p R 
E –r E < p R 
S –r S <
 R 
L –r L is satisﬁed. 
roof of Proposition 3. Table 2 suggests that the combinations of
iming strategies that constitute the SPNE are ( t r , t pD , t pR ) = (1, 1,
), (1, 1, 3), (2, 1, 3), or (2, 2, 3). The relationship of t pD ≤ t r in
he four combinations proves (i) in this proposition, whereas the
elationship of t pD < t pR proves (ii). 
roof of Proposition 4. By tracking identical solving processes by
he sequence shown in the proof for Proposition 1 with Eq. (6) as
he demand function instead of Eq. (1) , we derive the payoff func-
ions in the extended model as shown in this proposition. 
roof of Proposition 5. Based on the payoffs in Proposition 4 , the
ollowing inequalities that prove this proposition hold. The deﬁni-
ions of X R , B 1 , and B 2 in the inequalities are in Proposition 4. 
E − S = θ2 ( X R + s γR ) 2 / ( 8 b R B 1 ) > 0 
S − L = θ2 
(
8 b 2 D b 
2 
R − θ4 
)
( X R + s γR ) 2 / ( 4 b R B 1 B 2 ) > 0 
E − π S = −3 θ2 
(
16 b D b R + 5 θ2 
)
( X R + s γR ) 2 / 
(
16 b R B 
2 
1 
)
< 0 
S − π L = −θ4 
(
64 b 4 D b 
4 
R − 46 b 3 D b 3 R θ2 − 5 b 2 D b 2 R θ4 + 6 b D b R θ6 − θ8 
)
×( X R + s γR ) 2 / 
(
b R B 
2 
1 B 
2 
2 
)
< 0 

roof of Proposition 6. Only Sequence E constitutes the SPNE in
he extended model due to given the same logic behind the basic
odel shown in Proposition 3 . 
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